Indiana Law Journal
Volume 33

Issue 2

Article 17

Winter 1958

General Principles of Law, by Giorgio Del Vecchio
Paul Sayre
State University of Iowa College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Sayre, Paul (1958) "General Principles of Law, by Giorgio Del Vecchio," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 33 : Iss. 2
, Article 17.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol33/iss2/17

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

292

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

makes this error, and distorts the nature of the book which is essentially
analytic of legal problems in contracts to make wills. It is not in the
how-to-do vein of many estate planning texts, nor does it list and evaluate the respective merits of possible alternatives to contracts to make
wills such as annuities, trusts, or inter vivos transfers in return for a
promise of support for life (even perhaps with a security interest in the
promisee). Much of the current literature on estate planning is concerned with tax aspects, which are not touched in the present book. This
is regrettable for contracts to make wills raise difficult questions under
the federal income and estate taxes as well as under state inheritance
taxes."0
WILLIAM W.

OLIvERt

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW. By Giorgio Del Vecchio. Translated by Felix Forte. Introduction by Roscoe Pound. Boston University Press, 1956. Pp. x, 111. $3.50.

There must first be a word of honor for the translator. This book
is very largely his as well as the author's, because the translator has so
brilliantly made the author's actual thought available to the English
reader. This illustration occurs to me. In his own philosophy of law,
Professor Del Vecchio has as a test the sentimonto jwsticia, but he means
sentimonto in the Italian sense of sympathetic understanding, and not the
English sense of concept. The Italian sentimonto is not a term of rigid
analysis like our concept. It is a term of reverent understanding, that
takes its content from the idea of sympathetic interpretation and generous
loyalty, somewhat in the sense of the Spanish simpatico. In Spanish, a
true friend, or even a fair-minded person of any kind, considers everything simpatico. Thus simpatico becomes not a generous extra favor of
friendship, it becomes a minimum duty which puts you at fault if you
10.

Some possible questions under the federal tax laws are: Is the receipt of the

property by the promisee income or instead a bequest or devise under INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 102?; If income, how are the expenses of performance by the promisee to be
treated?; What will be the basis in the hands of the promise, cost or value at date of
decedent's death?; and Is there a deductible claim under INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §2053(c),
for the federal estate tax?
The Indiana Inheritance Tax includes transfers, "if made in payment of a claim
against the estate of a deceased person arising from a contract or antenuptial agreement
made by him and payable by its terms by will or contract at or after his death." IND.
ANN. STAT. §7-2401 (1953). See Comment, Applicability of Inheritance Taxation to
Contracts to Devise or Bequeath, 37 YALE L.J. 108 (1927).
1 Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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fail to use it. Thus we see at once that Del Vecchio meant this simpatico
element when he spoke of sentimonto jwsticia, and our word concept was
totally inadequate.
In cases of much more delicate interpretation than this, throughout
his wise and brilliant translation, Judge Forte gives the reader Del
Vecchio's true meaning as well as it could be done when there is a
change from one language to another.
Dean Pound's introduction is not only a brililant introduction to the
subject of natural law, but like judge Forte's translation, it really is a
necessary part of Del Vecchio's book itself. This little volume contains
all three, translation, introduction and text, and all three should be considered in understanding Del Vecchio's thought. For one thing, Dean
Pound puts Del Vecchio's thought in such a kindly and reasonable perspective, that he helps to win friends for Del Vecchio himself. The last
paragraph of Pound's introduction lists some of the different approaches
to natural law with moderation and honor for each:
Although my own preference is for the radical 'empiricism
of William James and the instrumentalism of John Dewey, I
realize that many feel the need of a firm metaphysical anchorage in something absolute and eternal and fear that, in the
quest of a philosophical doctrine helping to practical solutions
of practical problems of the legal order as a practical activity,
the law will be left too much at large and so between the Scylla
of a hard and fast doctrine holding back adjustment of law in
all its senses to the inevitable changes in the life it is to govern,
and the Charybdis of a trial and error empiricism guided by an
endeavor to secure the most of human expectation with the
least friction and waste, which may conceivably decay in action
to a justice without law, will prefer Scylla as the lesser risk.
Stammler saw the way through in natural law with a changing
or some say a growing content. Del Vecchio sees it in a natural
law universal in its essential content and variable only in its particular application. G6ny's Neo-Scholasticism finds it in social
life as a moral phenomenon, so that there is an ideal view of
changing life. I fear we all today sail nearer Charybdis, whatever we profess.
As I see it, Del Vecchio is anxious to objectify legal ideals, and he
does this by taking the Thomistic view of the five relationships, and saying that the basic sides of these relationships are fixed absolutely and
eternally by rules of natural law which can be found through the active
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reason (including ethics) and stated in specific terms of what the rule is
in those relationships. Then he says that deductions from these rules
are open to interpretation. But he does not pursue the Thomistic theory
in detail. Indeed, discussion of natural law by all thinkers in recent
years, has seemed to be less belligerent and rigid (if I may use these
terms) than it used to be. Perhaps Del Vecchio trenches mainly on the
fact that there is a relationship, and hence there is a basic need to have
dependable legal rules covering the relationship. He thinks this element
of dependability is necessary for liberty as well as for continuity, and
that it is untruthful as well as unwise to disregard it. Thus many
natural law thinkers under the canon law feel that the English decided
Baxter v. Baxter wrongly. In this case the House of Lords held that a
wife who refused intercourse to a husband, unless he used preventive
measures that would preclude offspring, had not given him cause for
separation and that this was not a violation of the contract of marriage.
The general principle is often stated, that sexual relations are implied
in the contract of marriage, but not the duty to bear children. The
Scholastic view is that the children must never be prevented in the sexual
act itself, on the ground that children are the chief end of marriage, and
hence can never be excluded. The decided cases for the most part in
nearly all countries hold that while children are the chief object of marriage, they need not always be sought, regardless of all circumstances.
The difference seems to turn on whether a literal, inviolable rule can be
deduced. from a natural law principle.
While often used under the canon law, and indeed used by Del
Vecchio although his particular ideal of law is not in Thomistic terms,
the canon law does not require adherence to natural law as a matter of
dogma. For instance, Professor Anton-Hermann Chroust of Notre
Dame University Law School is thought not to be an adherent of natural
law in the Scholastic sense.2
I hesitate to comment on other differences, for fear of extending
this review into an article or even a book in itself. The subject of the
natural law has been a matter of vast scholarship. A point of departure
I might suggest is that we talk in terms of what lawyers do, rather than
the complete and detailed system that they profess.
Could we not say then that there could be a process for deciding
cases that would include these three elements: (1) thought about and
honor of, human relationships; (2) use of active conscience especially
1.
2.
OPHIES

Baxter v. Baxter [1948] A.C. 274 (1947).
Chroust, On the Natural Law, in INTERPRETATIONS
80 & n. 24 and 25 (Sayre ed. 1947).
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in judging; and (3) realization that relationships are facts, but are subject to moral interpretation.
Perhaps some would say that natural law can be found by the active
(moral) reason, but not in the sense of giving an absolute rule, but only
in the sense of finding a good solution for the particular case.
PAUL SAYREt

t Professor, State University of Iowa College of Law.

Aphorisms for Attorneys
Ignorance of the law excuses no man.'
-- John Selden

One precedent creates another.

They

soon accumulate and constitute law.2
-- Junius

A decent and manly examination of
the acts of Government should be
not only tolerated, but encouraged.-William

Henry Harrison

It would not be thought very just or
wise to arraign the honorable professions
of law and physic because the one produces
4
the pettifogger and the other the quack.
-Henry

Clay

Let us consider the reason of the case.
For nothing is law that is not reason. 5
-Sir

John Powell

Even when laws have been written down,
they ought not always to remain unaltered.'
-Aristotle
Not even an attorney.
2

Hence, The United States

LAW WEEK.

3 See Statute Section, U. S. LAW WEEK.

4 Oops, sorry!
5 Or so we hope.

6 They don't. See U. S.

LAW WEEK passim.

*with footnotes by the Editors of
The United States LAw WEFEK, a
publication of The Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc., of
Washington, D. C.

